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Following the publication of the Weatherall report (a report on the use of 
non-human primates in research) this paper reflects on how to provide 
appropriate and ethical research models for research that is to be of benefit 
to humankind. Two of the main arguments that are used as a justification 
for the use of non-human primates in biomedical research are analysed. 
These are the ‘least harm greatest good’ and capacity arguments. This 
paper argues that these are equally applicable when considering whether 
or not humans are the appropriate subjects of biomedical research. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/jme.2007.020784  
 
Introduction 
The recent publication of the Weatherall report (a report on the use of non-
human primates in research) offers us an occasion to reflect on how to 
provide appropriate and ethical research models for research that is to be of 
benefit to humankind. The central goal of the working group which 
produced this report was to consider the scientific case for the use of non-
human primates in medical research in this country.[1] The report 
concentrated its investigation on the major areas in which non-human 
primate research is currently taking place: infectious diseases and 
neuroscience. Within these it was noted that the majority of research takes 
place by the pharmaceutical industry for drug development and toxicology 
studies. Primates are superior to other animal models for this type of 
research because of their “similarities with human physiological and 
behavioural characteristics”.[2] 
Given that biomedical research as a whole, and research in 
communicable diseases and the neurosciences in particular, may reap vast 
benefits for humankind, saving lives and decreasing disease morbidity, then 
it is imperative that it is carried out. The question, however, is who or what 
are the appropriate subjects of such research. The Weatherall report deals 
solely with biomedical research as applied to non-human primates and, to 
that end, includes a commendable section on the ethics of the use of non-
human primates for this. The issues discussed included, but were not 
restricted to, the moral status of non-human primates, cost-benefit analyses, 
personhood, sentience, and intelligence, and the conclusion reached was 
that: 
The justification for the continued use of non-human primates 
in research is that their use is required lest greater harm occur 
(p.130).[2] 
                                                 
*
 I would to thank the reviewers for their helpful comments. 
Quigley, M. 'Non-human Primates: The Appropriate Subjects of Biomedical 
Research?, Journal of Medical Ethics (2007) 33 (11): 655-658 
2 
 
The construction of these arguments produced by the Weatherall 
Committee appears to be both logically and ethically sound. However, it 
also appears that the key arguments used which indicate why this research 
should be carried out in non-human primates could also indicate why such 
research in fact ought to be carried out in human primates. If this is true, 
and I will argue in this paper that it is, then one comes to the inescapable 
conclusion that human rather than non-human primates are the appropriate 
subjects of this type of biomedical research. 
 
The Least Harm and the Greatest Good 
This justification cited above is based upon “the fact that the numbers of 
non-human primates used any medical experiment are very small and . . . 
the number of humans whose suffering is ameliorated is often very large” 
(p.130).[2] This is essentially a utilitarian argument involving the balancing 
of cost versus benefit. On this type of analysis, having taken into account 
the relative suffering of non-human primates versus human primates, and 
the relatively small numbers of non-human primates used versus the 
potentially huge benefit for a large number of humans, it does seem 
ethically justifiable to use non-human primates in medical research.  
However, these arguments are not only robust arguments for the use 
of non-human primates in medical research, but are also very good 
arguments for indicating why such research in fact ought to be carried out 
in human primates. This type of utilitarian argumentation would not only 
endorse the use of a relatively small number of humans for use in medical 
research but would, in combination with scientific evidence, make the use 
of humans ethically preferable. Given that the scientific case for the use of 
non-human primates rests on their similarity to humans, the only 
scientifically better model would be actual humans. It might be argued that 
it is often easier to control for experimental variables within animal 
populations than within human populations. However, you are more likely 
to generate aberrant outcomes when experimenting on non-humans as 
opposed to humans. This is because no matter how much you control for 
external parameters there may be biological differences which cannot be 
controlled for. There may intra-human variation when experimenting on 
humans but essentially the physiology remains within fixed bounds. 
Additionally it is clear that we cannot derive final and conclusive results 
from animal and non-human primate experimentation; if we could there 
would be no phase I, II, or III clinical trials in humans. Given this then we 
must seriously consider the case for using a very small number of humans 
for the large number whose suffering would be ameliorated. What exactly 
this might entail will be discussed later in the paper. 
This might be a contentious claim but if the use of humans in such 
research is not morally acceptable, whereas the use of non-human primates 
is, then we are committed to giving a robust reason why this is so. To 
decide that such a course of action is permissible by virtue of the non-
human status of some primates alone cannot be considered to be justifiable. 
To do this would be tantamount to what Singer calls speciesism[3] and is 
Quigley, M. 'Non-human Primates: The Appropriate Subjects of Biomedical 
Research?, Journal of Medical Ethics (2007) 33 (11): 655-658 
3 
 
void of decent moral justification in the same way that sexism and racism 
are. We must, therefore, ask ourselves what the morally relevant differences 
are (if any) between humans and non-human primates (and indeed between 
the higher non-human primates and the lower ones) that would justify us 
treating them differently.  
 
More Alike Than We Think 
One way of doing this might be to look at the characteristics possessed by 
each that might have a bearing on their moral status. This is important 
because in trying to decide whether or not it is justifiable to carry out 
biomedical research on non-human primates rather than humans we need to 
decide if the non-human primates have a moral status equivalent to that of 
humans, a moral status that is less than that, or whether they are in fact of 
no moral concern to us at all. 
The relevant characteristics, and the crux of this moral difference, 
according to the report seems to be “a difference in self-awareness, 
cognitive awareness, cognitive capacities and sentience between most non-
human primates and most humans” (p.130).[2] This is a differentiation 
based on capacity, and again it looks like a strong argument for the use of 
non-human primates in biomedical research. As Rachels maintains: 
Insofar as a human and a member of another species are 
similar, they should be treated similarly, while to the extent that 
they are different, they should be treated differently.[4] 
This is a similar notion to what Singer means when he says that animal’s 
deserve an “equal consideration”.[5] It represents the fact that if one makes 
a moral judgement with respect to specific criteria for a human, then if an 
animal meets those same criteria it is entitled to an equivalent judgement. 
In this respect, while being our closest relative on the evolutionary 
scale, the non-human primates do appear to have less self-awareness, 
cognitive awareness, and cognitive capacities than the normal adult human 
primates.[6] The problem, however, again becomes the fact that this type of 
reasoning is equally applicable to inter-human considerations as it is to 
those involving non-human primate versus human primate. Not all humans 
have equal capacities, and if it is justifiable to use capacity to differentiate 
between non-human primates and human primates, it is justifiable to use it 
to differentiate between humans themselves. Babies, young children, some 
severely disabled adults, and those in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) 
not only display less capacity than fully competent human adults but also 
display less than some non-human primates.  
Of course we could decide that these characteristics are not relevant. 
However, if we are to disregard and ignore the similarities and differences 
in capacity held by non-human primates that might speak for their moral 
status, then in the interests of consistency we ought to disregard those same 
characteristics in humans as well. And were we to do that there could be no 
good reason not to experiment on those humans of a similar level of 
capacity to that of most non-human primates.  
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Humans, Primates, and International Guidelines 
The numbers of non-human primates used in biomedical research as a 
whole is relatively small.[7] As pointed out above it is this fact, coupled 
with the benefit to a large number of people, which forms part of the 
justification for using them in this type of research. I made the case that this 
argument coupled with the scientific superiority of humans as the research 
model means that we ought to seriously consider the case for replacing the 
very small number of non-human primates with an equally small number of 
humans. 
It is a fact that there are many more humans involved as subjects in 
biomedical research than there are non-human primates.[8] The majority of 
this research on humans is on fully competent adults who have consented to 
their participation, and most of this research could be quantified in terms of 
risk or invasiveness as mild to moderate. This would be research which 
might involve observational studies, studies where biological samples such 
as blood, studies involving minor surgery such as creating skin lesions, or 
toxicity studies for drugs. The inherent risks, however, are ones which the 
(presumably) rational and competent adults who do take part in medical 
research are willing to take.  
Of those humans who do participate in biomedical research there is 
also a small proportion of them who lack capacity and who are, therefore, 
not legally competent to consent to their own involvement. We still permit 
the participation of such individuals as research subjects, but they are 
heavily protected by national and international research guidelines.[9] 
These guidelines have been developed with the express purpose of 
protecting those individuals whose lack of capacity makes them vulnerable. 
The International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research produced by 
the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 
says that ‘special justification’ is needed for the participation of vulnerable 
individuals in research.[10] Included in the categories of vulnerable people 
are those with ‘limited capacity’.[10] It seems to me that most non-human 
primates are of a level of capacity that, if they were human, would fall into 
this ‘vulnerable persons’ category, and would, therefore, have these 
guidelines speaking for their protection. Now if as argued previously we 
cannot differentiate between non-human primates and humans merely on 
the grounds of species membership, and if there is no difference in capacity 
between non-human primates and some humans, then surely these 
guidelines ought to protect both. 
If this is so then such guidelines ought to be consistently applied. 
There is one particular provision of interest which appears in slightly 
different formulations in both the Declaration of Helsinki and the CIOMS 
guidelines and that is essentially that medical research on vulnerable 
individuals must be either of benefit to that individual directly or be of 
benefit to people of their kind. The Declaration of Helsinki states that: 
These groups should not be included in research unless the 
research is necessary to promote the health of the population 
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represented and this research cannot instead be performed on 
legally competent persons.[11] 
Similarly the CIOMS guidelines state that: 
[T]he research is intended to obtain knowledge that will lead to 
improved diagnosis, prevention or treatment of diseases or 
other health problems characteristic of, or unique to, the 
vulnerable class – either the actual subjects or other similarly 
situated members of the vulnerable class.[10] 
It is difficult to see how the medical research carried out on non-human 
primates can ever be said to be of direct benefit to them or to their kind. At 
least research on vulnerable humans is of benefit to humankind. If we do 
want to concede that this research is of benefit to their kind then we must be 
their kind. And if we accept this as true we are another step closer to 
accepting that there does not appear to be a difference between human and 
non-human primates that justifies medical research on them but not us. 
 
Severely Invasive research 
The kind of research discussed above that humans do participate in, 
vulnerable or not, involves those procedures or studies which can be 
deemed to mild to moderately risky or invasive. The majority of research 
that is carried out on the non-human primates also falls into this 
category.[12] Fully competent adults already make decisions to participate 
in the majority research that carries this level of risk or invasiveness. For 
that reason there is at least the presumption that we could get such people to 
participate in all research of this manner. While it is probable that the 
difference in capacities experienced by non-human primates and adult 
humans means that there is a qualitative difference in the way they 
experience suffering, it is not clear that this directs us to using the non-
human primates for such research. But whilst the competent adult human 
might experience some suffering they can at least understand and 
rationalise it. These reasons, combined with the fact that humans are the 
scientifically preferable models for research that is to be of benefit to 
humankind, mean that there can be no good moral reason why we ought to 
use primates for this type of research. 
However, it is likely that we would be left with a small portion of 
biomedical research that no competent adult would consent to participate 
in. This is research that is of a highly invasive or risky nature; the type of 
research that the Weatherall Report maintains would be ‘totally 
inappropriate’ in humans (p.36).[2] Examples of this might be research that 
involves being infected with viral agents like HIV (pp.43-57),[2] or which 
requires producing experimental brain lesions (p.67).[2] What then are we 
to do in this situation? Are we simply not to conduct this type of research? 
It may be that this is the right course of action, but if, as intimated in 
the Weatherall Report, the real dangers posed to individuals and to 
humankind by certain illnesses and diseases are so immense then we may 
be remiss in our moral duties if this research is not done. If this is the case 
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then such dangers coupled with the potential benefits to humankind from 
this type of research might constitute that ‘special justification’ required by 
the CIOMS guidelines for the participation of those ‘vulnerable’ individuals 
mentioned earlier. Of course, as also mentioned earlier, consistency would 
dictate that we include both ‘vulnerable’ human and non-human primates of 
limited capacity in this.[13]  
This is not to say that I am putting forward a case for ascribing rights 
to non-human primates, or indeed to animals in general. I am not. But then 
neither am I advocating the ascription of rights to those humans of a similar 
level of capacity. If one thinks, as I do, that the normative function of rights 
is the protection of autonomy, then those which do not have the requisite 
capacity for autonomy cannot be rights-holders.[14] That said the moral 
supportability of our treatment of any being does not reside in rights. That 
they are not deemed to be rights-holders is not to say that either the 




It seems that the benchmark of whether or not it is morally justifiable to 
conduct certain types of medical research on non-human primates is 
whether or not we would carry out that research on humans of a similar 
level of capacity. If we decide that research on these types of humans is 
acceptable then it is celebration time for the non-human primates as they 
are no longer needed because the scientific evidence tells us that research 
on humans is better. If on the other hand we decide that research on this 
category of humans is not ethically acceptable then I can see no good 
reason why it ought to be conducted on non-human primates. Either way it 
seems that the non-human primates win. 
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